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Malaysian foreign policy under Mahathir (1981-2003) has been described as 
independent, active and pragmatic. Two decades of Mahathir’s leadership 
have resulted in Malaysia becoming more internationally recognised as a 
model of stable, multicultural and developing country with a relatively 
impressive economy. Malaysia was also regarded as an exemplary progressive 
and moderate Islamic country. While the importance of trade and investment 
was evident as the basis of Malaysia’s external ties with many countries 
(including the Commonwealth of Independence States – CIS), other factors 
which included religion (Islam) in the context of multiculturalism also became 
significant determinants. In effect, Malaysia’s international image has, 
undoubtedly, been promoted and enhanced by many of Mahathir’s bold and 
innovative policy initiatives. However, foreign policy under Abdullah Badawi 
was rather lacklustre due to preoccupation with domestic challenges such as 
intra-UMNO/ BN bickering (including the MCA) and the growing influence 
of the Opposition coalition led by Anwar Ibrahim. Despite the lack of focus, 
Abdullah succeeded in thawing relations with Singapore, and Malaysia 
attracted the attention of the US as a progressive Islamic nation with the Islam 
Hadhari brand. This paper argues the need for Malaysia to bolster its 
international image and standing through new foreign policy initiatives which 
are relevant and responsive to the changing dynamics of the domestic as well 
as the regional and global political economy. Set against the backdrop of a 
more demanding political scenario and recessionary global economy, the 
paper contends that Malaysia should reprioritise and reposition its foreign 
policy direction and initiatives to leverage on more focussed relations with key 
countries, namely the US and China (PRC). This should be part of Najib’s 
strategy to reclaim political legitimacy and ensure economic transformation on 

















This paper provides an overview of the foreign policy orientation and external 
relations of Malaysia in the post-Mahathir period. After more than two 
decades of assertive and dynamic foreign policy under former prime minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003), the vitality of Malaysian diplomacy seemed 
to have receded under his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009).  
There is no doubt that the pursuant of what could be described as 
‘conventional’ foreign relations initiatives of the Abdullah era contrasted with 
the identity of policy with person characteristic of Mahathir diplomatic 
adventures. 
 
Notwithstanding, this paper argues that after more than a five-year hiatus in 
the foreign policy arena of the country, it is imperative for the leadership 
helmed by Najib Razak to examine the foreign policy priorities and direction 
of the country. As the new administration tries to grapple with many domestic 
challenges and problems emanating both from within the domestic as well as 
the external environment, the formulation of well thought-out and strategic 
foreign policy initiatives will help address some of these pressing issues.    
 
This paper also contends that it is indeed imperative for Malaysia to review its 
relations with selected countries and regions of the world to meet-up the 
challenges from an increasingly volatile international political and economic 
environment.  Malaysia under Najib needs to re-position itself as an active and 
serious regional and global actor. The time has come for Malaysia to revisit 
and prioritise its external relations in an increasingly volatile world. In effect, 
the pursuant of a pragmatic foreign policy by the Najib administration is 
crucial in helping to realise many of the domestic agendas of the country 
against the backdrop of a stronger Opposition and global economic 
uncertainties. 
 
The paper is divided into three major parts. The first part provides a brief 
outline of Malaysian foreign policy initiatives and direction under the 
visionary leadership of Mahathir Mohamad. An assessment of the country’s 
external relations with selected countries as well as within the context of 
multilateral arrangements under the Abdullah administration will soon follow. 
The final part of the paper provides some suggestions on the foreign policy 
priorities and direction of prime minister Najib Razak which are instrumental 
in providing legitimacy and stability to the government of the day.  
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Mahathir’s Achievement in Foreign Policy Arena: A Brief Overview 
 
Much has been said about the foreign policy orientation and external relations 
of Malaysia under the leadership of the country’s fourth prime minister, 
Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003).1 Mahathir has left an almost inimitable 
legacy in Malaysia’s foreign policy arena. In addition to the domestic 
considerations, Malaysia’s external conduct was very much influenced by the 
strong personality of Mahathir. There is no doubt that Malaysia had benefited 
tremendously from its active participation and growing prominence in the 
international arena during more than 20 years of Mahathir’s leadership.  
 
• ‘Look East’ Policy and Mahathir’s Developmental Agenda 
One significant development in Malaysian foreign policy orientation under the 
Mahathir leadership was the country’s close relations with Northeast Asia, 
namely Japan and South Korea, as manifested in the implementation of ‘Look 
East’ policy.2  Mahathir’s deep personal admiration for the ‘miraculous’ 
economic achievement of post-World War II Japan has been discussed at 
length by many local as well as international scholars.3  The decision of the 
Mahathir administration to launch the ‘Look East’ policy after only a few 
months in office were mainly to encourage Malaysians to emulate the 
Japanese work ethics, business management techniques and technology and 
also to acquire Japanese expertise and capital, through aid and investment and 
trade cooperation.4  As announced by Mahathir:  
 
                                               
1
 Saravanamuttu, J. (1980). Malaysia’s Foreign Policy 1957-1980; and (1997); and ‘ASEAN 
in Malaysian Foreign Policy Discourse and Practice (1967-1997),’ Asian Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 5, No. 1. See also Camroux, D. (1994). “‘Looking East’ … Inwards: Internal 
Factors in Malaysian Foreign Relations during the Mahathir Era, 1981-1994,” Papers No. 72, 
Griffith University Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations-Australia-Asia. 
2
 Khadijah Md. Khalid. (1999). Malaysia-Japan Relations: Explaining the Root Causes of the 
Pro-Japan Orientation of Malaysia in the Post-1981 Period (unpublished PhD thesis, School 
of Oriental and African Studies). See also Khadijah Md. Khalid & Lee, P. P. (2003). Whither 
the Look East Policy? UKM Press. 
3
 See, for example, Jomo K. Sundaram. (Ed.). (1985). The Sun Also Sets: Lessons in Looking 
East and (1994). Japan and Malaysia: In the Shadow of the Rising Sun; Grace, E. K. P. 
(1990). “Looking for a Way Out by ‘Looking East’: An Analysis of Malaysia’s Look East 
Policy.’ Kajian Malaysia, Vol. VIII, No. 2.; Fujio, Hara. (1993). ‘Japan and the Malaysian 
Economy: An Analysis of the Relations Started with Reparations after the End of World War 
II.’ In Fujio, Hara (Ed.). Formation and Restructuring of Business in Malaysia. Tokyo 
Institute of Developing Economies; Lee, P. P. (1984). ‘Changing Perceptions of Japan.’ In 
Morrison, C. E. (Ed.). Presence and Perceptions: The Underpinnings of ASEAN-Japan 
Relations. Japan Center for International Exchange, (1988). The Japanese Model and 
Southeast Asia with Particular Reference to Malaysia.’ Kajian Malaysia, Vol. VI. 
4
 See Khadijah (1999). Op. cit. 
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‘You may be aware that lately I have been 
exhorting Malaysians to emulate the Japanese, 
particularly in work ethics and ethical values.  
This re-orientation is crucial at this juncture in 
the development of the country ….. We have for 
a long time been looking for the West, as did 
Japan in the early days of her development. But 
the West is no longer a suitable model.  They 
have lost the drive.’5 
 
It has to be stated that Mahathir’s decision to re-orient Malaysia’s focus in 
bilateral relations with Japan stemmed from his personal admiration and 
experience when visiting the latter in 1961.  He was deeply impressed with the 
rapid pace of physical development of Japan alongside the ease with which the 
switch from production of low- quality to high quality goods at competitive 
prices within a short span in the aftermath of the Second World War.6  Such an 
account provides an interesting corroboration of the personal nature of 
Mahathir’s foreign policy.  In short, the ‘Look East’ policy was seen as a 
radical departure from Malaysia’s conservative foreign policy stance that is 
from pro-Western, namely pro-British to a pro-Japanese. Under the Mahathir 
leadership, Malaysia had taken a bold step to reduce her dependence on her 
former colonial master.  
 
Mahathir’s ‘Look East’ policy was further expressed in the idea of an ‘East 
Asia Economic Grouping’ (or EAEG) and later renamed, ‘East Asia Economic 
Caucus’ (EAEC). The formation of NAFTA, among others, gave Tun Dr. 
Mahathir the impetus to develop the EAEC. The EAEC was conceived to 
promote the regional economy.7 However, its protectionist connotations would 
have been unacceptable to some ASEAN countries. Singapore, for example, 
depends heavily on a very open economy.8  Moreover, Mahathir’s exclusivist 
approach in positing the EAEC as a rival to the major trading blocs was 
unacceptable not least in that Australia, New Zealand and the US were 
regarded as outsiders. This exclusiveness reflected Mahathir’s defensive 
                                               
5
 Speech by Mahathir Mohamad at the 5th Joint Annual Conference of MAJECA/JAMECA, 
Kuala Lumpur, 8 February 1982; reproduced in Koleksi Ucapan Mahathir, Vol. 4, 1992:34-
35, as quoted in ibid. Malaysia-Japan Relations: Explaining the Root Causes of the Pro-Japan 
Orientation of Malaysia in the Post-1981 Period. Chapter One, Part III, page 12.  
6
 Mahathir Mohamad. (2004). Achieving True Globalisation. See Chapter 7, page 72. 
Pelanduk Publications.  
7
 Mahathir (2004). Chapter 1, pages 4-5. Op. cit. 
8
 Takashi Terada, “Constructing an ‘East Asian’ concept and growing regional identity: from 
EAEC to 
ASEAN+3,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 16 No. 2 (2003). 
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attitude towards the West, and uncompromising stance regarding persisting 
imbalance in the international political economy. 
 
• Malaysia and the West 
Much has been said about Mahathir’s negative perception and attitude towards 
the West, as exemplified in his ‘Buy British Last’ campaign during the early 
months of his administration.9  In fact, the pro-Japan orientation of Malaysia 
during most of the 1980s and 1990s had been linked to the perceived 
Mahathir’s ‘anti-West’ stance which later included his strong criticism against 
the U.S political and economic domination in the international arena. 
However, to insist that Mahathir’s attitude towards the West could easily be 
lumped together in an undifferentiated mode is simplistic and overlooks one 
important point. That is that the developmental politics which Mahathir 
inherited from previous prime ministers meant that Malaysia continued to be 
open to foreign direct investment (FDI) from the West.  
It has been highlighted that as a visionary leader, Mahathir’s heavy 
industrialisation policy played a vital part in influencing his foreign policy 
outlook. This demanded an investment policy which depends on high 
technology, not only from Japan and Northeast Asia but crucially the West 
too. Furthermore, the emphasis on infrastructural development as an engine of 
economic growth such as the Penang Bridge, Multimedia Super-Corridor 
(MSC), PETRONAS Twin Towers (also known as Kuala Lumpur City Centre 
- KLCC), Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA) Putrajaya etc. 
popularised Malaysia on the world map. This boosted FDI as infrastructural 
development provided the requisite pre-conditions. However, the pro-FDI 
approach to fuel an export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) was coupled with 
strident anti-West rhetoric in the name of Asian values, etc.  
 
Mahathir’s anti-Western posture was mainly shaped by the need to counter-
balance the inequitable relationship which still persists in another form in the 
post-colonial era. Thus, the dual attitude or bifurcation in the geo-political and 
geo-economic dimensions of Malaysia’s foreign policy under Tun Dr. 
Mahathir was directed at the West or Northern hemisphere. However, he did 
not condemn the West for being rich and powerful; rather, he was against 
perceived hypocrisy and double-standards expressed especially in multilateral 
arrangements which were heavily biased against the rights and interests of the 
developing and less developing nations. Mahathir was also deeply mistrustful 
of the formally materialistic worldview of the West, which was contrary to 
what he called, ‘Asian values’ and the cultures of the East. Thus it is hardly 
surprising that his leadership style placed him at odds with the International 
                                               
9
 See Khadijah (1999). Op. cit. 
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Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ‘Washington Consensus’ at the height of the 
Asian Financial Crisis (1997).  
 
• Malaysia’s Growing Relations With the Muslim World   
Malaysia’s relations with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
were no less strong.10 Mahathir’s vitriol against the West on behalf of the 
worldwide Muslim community (ummah) has been legendary, and further 
promoted his image as an acerbic spokesperson of the South hemisphere.11 
The issue of Palestine figure strongly in Mahathir’s representation of 
Malaysia’s Islamic identity which was very much influenced by the increasing 
rise of ummah consciousness which promoted overt solidarity with the rest of 
the Muslim world.12 The inter-locking of Malaysia’s humanitarian 
responsibility with its foreign policy considerations was also aptly 
demonstrated in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1992 war. 
Mahathir expressions of sympathy to fellow religionists in Bosnia-
Herzegovina who were involved in an ethnic strife with the Serb majority took 
various forms. Apart from assuming a prominent stage in Malaysia foreign 
policy, the issue of Bosnian independence was also actively supported by the 
Mahathir administration.13 
 
Trade and investment flourished between Malaysia and the rest of the OIC, 
although still fall short compared to ASEAN, US, Japan and the Europe. 
Mahathir pushed for greater economic cooperation and integration fostered by 
the investment role of Islamic Development Bank (IDB) based on the concept 
of mudarabah.14 Mahathir was partly motivated by the desire to see a more 
resilient and advanced OIC in the making.15 In the final analysis, the OIC was 
integral to Mahathir’s agenda of boosting Malaysia’s international profile and 
thereby to also strengthen his political legitimacy at home to counter the 
criticism and dissent from the Malay dimension of the Opposition. 
                                               
10
 See Khadijah (1999). Op. cit. 
11
 For an analysis of Mahathir’s political outbursts in the context of the OIC, see e.g. 
K.Gajendra Singh. (2003). ‘OIC Summit, Mahathir's speech and post-OIC reverberations,’ 
South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG). Source; 
[http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper823.html].  
12
 Consult, for example, Mahathir Mohamad & Hashim Makaruddin. (2001). Islam & the 
Muslim Ummah: Selected Speeches of Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
Pelanduk Publications. 
13
 W. S. W. Hassan, R. Dollah, R. Z. Idris, Z. Othman, Aizan A. M. Zain. ‘A Brief Note on 
Malaysia’s Responses to the Bosnian Conflict.’ (Retrieved from a PDF document. Source 
undetermined).  
14
 Khadijah Md. Khalid. (2004). ‘Malaysia’s Growing Economic Relations with the Muslim 
World,’ Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. 
Source: [http://kyotoreview.cseas.kyotou.ac.jp/issue/issue4/article_362.doc].  
15
 Ibid. 




Under the Mahathir administration, Malaysia’s economic and socio-cultural 
(for example, in higher education) relations with the Muslim world began to 
expand quite rapidly.16 Tourists from the Middle East flock Malaysia in 
droves, particularly during the summer season, as the country is increasingly 
popularised as an attractive destination for fellow Muslims. The attention of 
Islamic countries from the Middle East towards Malaysia in the socio-cultural 
spheres was to intensify in the wake of the 911. Travel advice by Western 
governments, principally the US had adversely affected tourism in Malaysia. 
However, Malaysia was quick to capitalise on the opportunity offered by a 
stricter immigration control which bordered on racial/religious profiling and 
targeting vis-à-vis Muslims, especially the male gender.17  
 
The growing economic relations and exchanges between Malaysia and 
selected OIC member-nations reflected the value placed by the Mahathir 
administration on the Middle East as constituting an important growth market, 
and emerging geo-political bloc capable of challenging Western assumptions 
and status quo. 
 
• Malaysia’s ‘Expansion’ into Central Asia 
The ‘Look East’ policy, however, did not prove to be restrictive of Mahathir’s 
attention to other countries. Another striking example of his move to wean 
Malaysia from its historical pro-West orientation is seen in the quest to 
enhance relations with countries which were viewed unfavourably by the 
West, particularly the United States, such as the Sudan, Myanmar and Cuba. 
There is no doubt that Malaysia’s favourable and positive image amongst the 
former Soviet republics in Central Asia most prominently Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan today could be attributed to the far-sighted foreign policy of the 
Mahathir administration towards the region as soon as they achieved 
independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.18 Malaysia was alert 
to the developments in Central Asia, and hastened bilateral relations with the 
former Soviet republics. Under a new political arrangement, they had - 
together with Russia as the ex-patron - become the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). 
 
                                               
16




 Personal communication with several senior officials and former participants of the 
Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP) from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
during the writer’s visit to the two countries in November 2006. The writer was invited to join 
the one-week mission with the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). 
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Mahathir was interested in the introduction of market reforms, for example, in 
Kazakhstan. Not only could trade and investment between the two countries 
be forged and expanded in the long-run, Malaysia could also be touted as a 
model of economic success for emulation.19 It is this sphere of interest, 
particularly through transfer of developmental experience (usually hailed as 
South-South cooperation),20 which would have suited Mahathir’s personal 
inclination to reach out for political allies in the pursuit of a united alternative 
front to Western hegemonic interests. 
 
• Malaysia and South-South Cooperation 
The other initiatives to harness the aspirations and interests of the developing 
world and provide them with a single voice could be seen in, for example, the 
formation D8 (or Developing Eight) which brought together Muslim majority 
countries with strong economic potential based on their rate of growth. The 
D8 was conceived to enable more focused multilateral relations within the 
developing world, whilst simultaneously maintaining and fostering ties with 
other fellow South-South nations.21 The ‘mobilisation’ of the developing and 
less developing nations in advocacy and protection of their interests has been 
integral to Mahathir’s foreign policy vision.  
 
To foster networking capacities to especially promote the pooling of 
technology for development, Mahathir also took the initiative to propose the 
Langkawi International Dialogue (LID) which is based on the concept of 
‘Smart Partnership.’22 The LID was to provide the nations in the less 
developing category with the leverage on technical expertise through capacity-
building and other forms of cooperation.  
 
                                               
19
 Refer to speech by Mahathir Mohamad at the Kazakhstan-Malaysia Business Meeting in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan (19 July 1996). Source: 
[http://www.pmo.gov.my/ucapan/?m=p&p=mahathir&id=1208].  
20
 Malaysia was one of the leading pioneers in the concept of technical cooperation amongst 
developing countries (TCDC) which aimed at sharing the country’s competencies where it has 
the experience and expertise. See the homepage of the Malaysian Technical Cooperation 
Programme (MTCP) for further information. For an analysis of Malaysia’s emerging relations 
with Central Asia, see. Stark, J. (2006). “‘Snow Leopard’ meets Asian Tiger,” The Round 
Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 95, Issue 385, pages 455-
471. 
21
 For a concrete account of the intra-D8 relations, see Stark, J. (2009). ‘Malaysia-Pakistan 
Linkages: Searching for New Diversified Regional Contacts,’ The Round Table: The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Volume 98, Issue 401. 
22
 See the LID website at 
[http://www.kln.gov.my/lid2007/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1].  
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Another aspect of Mahathir’s personal charge of Malaysia’s foreign policy 
was his authoritarian (‘iconoclast’) style.23 This meant he could afford to 
transform Malay nationalism from the narrow confines of racial domination 
(or hegemony) and inter-ethnic rivalry to an international role. Thus, his 
foreign policy outlook has as its purpose consolidating and expanding Malay 
nationalist aspirations which transcended domestic politicking. In other words, 
Malay nationalism as an important domestic determinant under Mahathir’s 
watch served his foreign policy agenda. As been already noted, Mahathir’s 
approach is not unlike Sukarno’s revolutionary vision of continuing the 
struggle against neo-imperialism. Malaysia’s foreign policy stance also began 
to be much more economically-oriented than ever before.  
 
In summary, the relatively stable Malaysian domestic politics and economy 
during most of the 1980s until the 1997-98 East Asian financial crises had 
contributed to the successful of Malaysian foreign policy conduct. The 
Mahathir leadership had succeeded in building the international reputation and 
image of Malaysia as a respectable regional as well as global player through 
its multiple roles in various multilateral arrangements while developing new 
strategic partnerships (at the bilateral level) with certain countries around the 
globe. Thus, whilst it cannot be denied while economic factors continued to be 
of decisive importance in Mahathir’s foreign policy, this was aligned with 
‘symmetrical’ factors such as religious and geographical solidarity. So much 
so that it could also be pointed out that economic and political determinants in 
Mahathir’s foreign policy responsible for branding Malaysia on the world map 
were at times so inter-twined as to be hardly distinguishable. 
 
Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Orientation post-Mahathir: The Abdullah 
Years 
 
When the foreign policy of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi - who was prime 
minister from 2003 to 2009 - is compared to Mahathir’s, there is marked or 
significant difference in style and emphasis. It could be argued that after years 
of active foreign relations and diplomacy under Mahathir, many who were 
directly involved in the policy implementation/execution were left 
proverbially exhausted. While many of Wisma Putra officials appreciated the 
soft and accommodating style of Abdullah, they had to deal with the perceived 
abrasiveness of the foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar (1999-2008).24 
 
                                               
23
 See Saravanamuttu, J. (1996). ‘Malaysia’s foreign policy in the Mahathir period, 1981-
1995: An iconoclast come to rule,’ Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4, No. 1.  
24
 Personal communication with senior Wisma Putra officials and diplomats. 
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The foreign policy legacy left by Mahathir had posed an immense challenge 
Abdullah to ‘measure up,’ and perhaps even to exceed. Thus, it was perceived 
that Abdullah’s foreign policy could always be ‘eclipsed’ by Mahathir’s 
standing in the international community as a doughty defender of Third World 
and South-South rights/interests; and the architect of Malaysia’s entry into 
multilateral trade arrangements, and new markets. In reference to the foreign 
policy expectations of Abdullah, a prominent Malaysian scholar opined:  
 
                       ‘Other policies include … 
Mahathir’s clarion call for [reforms of the UN] 
... I [do not] think the substance of foreign 
policy will change in any way. However, 
Abdullah’s style is going to impact upon his 
foreign policy, which means … he will be less 
confrontational.’25  
 
Despite the impressive electoral performance of Abdullah in the March 2004 
general elections only six months after taking over the premiership from 
Mahathir, his administration was soon criticised for being weak, lacking in 
focus and direction. Abdullah soon became pre-occupied with the domestic 
challenges emanating from within UMNO as well as the emerging Opposition 
coalition. And this was to impact on his foreign policy performance to an 
extent. 
 
• Islam Hadhari and Malaysia’s Foreign Relations under the 
Abdullah administration 
The Abdullah administration had its own distinctive features amongst one of 
which was Islam Hadhari which emphasises universal values, personal piety, 
and mastery of scientific and technological knowledge. Islam Hadhari was to 
be his personal hallmark. According to Abdullah … 
 
‘Islam Hadhari [is] the way to good 
governance, that is to say, the way in which the 
government hopes to administer to the well-
                                               
25
 Chandra Muzaffar. 2003. ‘Malaysian Politics: The Emerging Scenario under Abdullah 
Badawi.’ Institute of Southeast Asia Studies (Retrieved 12 August 2009 from 
http://web.iseas.edu.sg.152003.pdf). 
Malaysian Foreign Policy Orientation and Relations in the Post-Mahathir Years 
317 
 
being of the country, and the welfare of its multi-
religious and multi-racial population.’26 
 
Islam Hadhari was integral to Abdullah’s personal mission to build Malaysia 
towards excellence, glory, and distinction (cemerlang, gemilang, dan 
terbilang).27 It had the political advantage in portraying the Islamic credentials 
of the Abdullah administration whilst simultaneously appealing to the non-
Muslim electorate. This is set in the context of the on-going rivalry - which 
represents a carry-over from the Mahathir era - for the allegiance of the Malay 
heartlands and contestation over the political role of Islam in Malaysia.28  
 
In the 1999 general elections, the opposition party and arch-rival, Parti Islam 
Se-Malaysia (PAS),29 had made considerable inroads into the constituencies of 
the dominant partner in the ruling coalition, i.e. United Malays National 
Organisation (UMNO). Then, PAS gained 27 parliamentary seats and formed 
the state government in two key states of the Malay heartlands - Kelantan and 
Terengganu. The impressive electoral showing by PAS reflected the political 
ripples in the Malay community which had never been so polarised. The 
results represented a very high proportion of Malay voters rejecting UMNO, 
which diminished the party’s traditional standing, including the claim to 
uphold Islam. Thus, Islam Hadhari owed its origins partially to the choice of 
Mahathir to pick a successor who had the appropriate Islamic appeal to woo 
back the lost votes.30 
 
Although Islam Hadhari was to attract opprobrium and stringent criticism at 
home because of perceived implications for the religion in terms of its 
relevance, ironically it received positive response from the US as early as 
October 2003 when Abdullah took on the reins of leadership. The US 
Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy, Karen Hughes was reported to have 
praised Islam Hadhari as a ‘powerful example’ for all Muslims.31 Islam 
                                               
26
 Quoted from Hourdequin, P. (2008). ‘Malaysia’s 2005-2008 refugee stand-off with 
Thailand: A security analysis,’ International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Volume 8.  
27
 Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid. (2009). ‘The New Challenges of Political Islam in Malaysia,’ 
Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 154. Paper presented at the Asia Research Centre 
Conference on New Modes of Governance and Security Challenges in the Asia-Pacific, 
Murdoch University, Perth, 12-13 February 2009. Source: 
[http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp154.pdf].  
28
 See Khadijah Md. Khalid. (2007). ‘Voting for change: Islam and personalised politics in the 
2004 general elections.’ In Edmund Terence Gomez (Ed.), Politics in Malaysia: The Malay 
Dimension, Routledge.  
29
 Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party - PMIP (English translation). 
30
 Khadijah (2007). Op. cit. 
31
 Gatsiounis, I. (2006) ‘Islam Hadhari in Malaysia,’ Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 
3. Source: [http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/islam-hadhari-in-malaysia].  
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Hadhari, therefore, could be said have been groomed and poised at its 
conceptualisation to be a crucial element in Abdullah’s foreign policy as Islam 
Hadhari also stresses moderation and inter-civilisational dialogue.  
 
On the economic front, Abdullah has been an ardent proponent of Malaysia as 
a leading halal hub and centre in all range of competencies and activities – 
accreditation and certification; manufacturing; supply chain, etc.32 The halal 
industry is estimated to be worth USD3 trillion per year, and Abdullah wanted 
to position Malaysia to tap into the global market, especially as represented by 
the OIC. For Abdullah, the halal issue was linked to the agenda of reform in 
the OIC and empowerment of the ummah through trade and investment which 
at same time functions as a bridge between East and West.  
 
Whereas Mahathir was keen to portray Malaysia as a leading a rapidly 
developing Muslim country with ostentatious display of impressive 
architectural and infrastructural icons - tangible features; Abdullah, on the 
other hand, preferred to accentuate the image of Malaysia as exhibiting 
progressive and moderate Islamic ideals as embodied in Islam Hadhari – 
intangible features. Once again, this aspect of different approaches to the role 
of Islam in nation-building, and by extension, foreign policy reflects the 
personal temperament of both figures. Mahathir was a ‘doer’ whereas in 
contrast, Abdullah’s background is as an intellectual and Islamic scholar.33 
 
• Malaysia’s Relations with the United States of America (USA) 
A discernible trend in Malaysia’s foreign policy under Abdullah was the 
advantage derived from leveraging his personality to build closer rapport with 
other leaders.34  This included Malaysia’s relationship with the US under 
President George W. Bush. Such a more cordial working relationship has been 
enhanced by the geo-political landscape of post-September 2001, where the 
US has become more accommodative of Malaysia’s interests. This reflects 
Malaysia’s role in the region as a valuable ally in the fight against terrorism.35  
                                               
32
 See, for example, the keynote address by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi at the World Halal 
Forum (2008), Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre (12 May 2008).  
Source: [http://www.worldhalalforum.org/download/speech/Speech08-PM.pdf ].  
33
 For a highly astute biography of Mahathir Mohamad, see Khoo, B. T. (2003). Paradoxes of 
Mahathirism: An Intellectual Biography of Mahathir Mohamad, Oxford University Press 
(OUP). For Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, consult Syed Ali Tawfik Al-Attas, & Ng, T. C. (2005). 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi: Revivalist of an Intellectual Tradition, Pelanduk Publications. 
34
 Welsh (2005). Op. cit. 
35
 Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2004). ‘Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement,’ Working 
Paper No. 72, (formerly Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies) Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). 




In addition to the changing landscape brought by the event of the 911 terrorist 
attacks on American soil, Abdullah’s non-controversial foreign policy also 
contributed greatly to the ‘normalisation’ in US-Malaysia ties. Interestingly 
enough, Abdullah’s deputy, Najib Razak who was to succeed him as prime 
minister is also well-liked in the political and military circles of the US. For 
example, the Heritage Foundation, an avowed neo-conservative think-tank, 
welcomed Najib’s speech in his capacity as Defence Minister in 2002 as 
echoing the sentiments of US, despite certain policy disagreements.36 
 
Furthermore, Abdullah’s impressive electoral performance in 2004 provided 
him with the confidence and legitimacy to resolve the Anwar issue which had 
soured US-Malaysia relations.37 It is argued however, the Anwar issue is not a 
major factor in Abdullah’s stature vis-à-vis the US. Abdullah’s keenness in 
leveraging on Malaysia’s important role as a mediator in conflict resolution 
efforts involving particularly the region such as Muslim separatist groups in 
the Philippines and Thailand was significant. For it enhanced Malaysia’s 
profile as a moderate Muslim country and a reliable partner in bilateral 
cooperation for regional peace and security.38 Malaysia’s counter-terrorist 
collaboration included intelligence sharing, detention of suspected terrorists, 
and hosting training courses such as workshops and seminars.39 
 
Intriguingly though, the Scomi scandal/affair which became an explosive issue 
for the Malaysian opposition parties to pile pressure on Abdullah, had initially 
seemed to cast doubt on the continuing viability of US-Malaysia relations.40 
Ironically, the issue encouraged the US to work more closely with Malaysia in 
combating terrorism in its various forms.41 This is a reflection of the evolving 
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 Sodhy, P. (2007). ‘Malaysia-US Relations.’ In Abdul Razak Baginda (Ed.). Malaysia’s 
Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change. For an analysis of US-Malaysia relations pre- and 
post ‘September 11,’ see Khadijah Md. Khalid. (2003). “‘September 11’ and the changing 
dynamics of Malaysia-US relations,” Asian Review. 
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 Scomi Precision Engineering was accused of producing centrifuges for nuclear enrichment. 
The buyer country was said to have been Libya, a country then blacklisted as supporting 
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nature of US-Malaysia relations given the dynamics of regional and global 
security.  
 
• Malaysia’s External Relations in the Context of Multilateral 
Organisations  
There is no doubt that Malaysia’s international standing had been seriously 
affected by the lack of new initiatives and assertiveness in the country’s 
foreign policy conduct under Abdullah. Nevertheless, his role as prime 
minister was actually welcomed by many quarters, particularly those serving 
in Wisma Putra after years of Mahathir’s personal direction and micro-
management of foreign policy.42 It must be highlighted, however, that 
Abdullah’s foreign policy directions were only a part of his wider reform 
agenda, and personal challenge of carving out a distinctive brand of 
leadership.43  To do this, he had to distance himself from his predecessor and 
set a new tone.44  
 
Abdullah built on his congenial personality to forge closer relationships with 
the leaders of inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). In addition, Malaysia has had a long-standing history of 
active participation in the global citizenship forum of the United Nations and 
its agencies and subsidiaries such as World Health Organisation (WHO), Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). During his time as 
prime minister, Malaysia was chairman of the ASEAN, OIC and NAM.45  
 
A subtle or nuanced but striking contrast nonetheless is to be sought in 
Abdullah’s ‘principled foreign policy’ approach in which multilateralism was 
rehabilitated as an inclusive concept from the ideologically-biased connotation 
it bore under Mahathir’s tenure, which was based on the polarisation of the 
international community.46  That is, for Abdullah there only ought to be in 
reality only ‘uni-multilateralism,’ not ‘multi-multilateralism.’ To elaborate, 
multilateralism in practice should embrace both the ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ 
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 Personal communication with several senior Wisma Putra officials and diplomats. 
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 Abdullah was chairman of ASEAN from 2005-2006 before relinquishing the post to 
Singapore’s Lee Hsien Loong.  
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hemispheres, ‘East’ and ‘West’, etc. in concerted action and with both 
considered as inside the same circle of cooperation and alignment.47  Thus, 
Malaysia’s foreign policy attitude was to be more measured in expressing the 
national interests. In April 2004 at a meeting of senior diplomats, Abdullah 
articulated his approach in the following quote: 
 
‘... Malaysia’s foreign policy should not be a 
static doctrine … It must always be a dynamic 
instrument … [and] an enlightened policy … so 
as to make Malaysia an acceptable and reliable 
partner in inter-state affairs.’48 
 
a) Malaysia and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) 
Under Mahathir, Malaysia had heightened its leading role in the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) by becoming a vocal critic of Western ‘hegemony’. During 
Abdullah’s tenure as Chairman of NAM, Malaysia continued to press for 
reform of the international economic order, though in a more moderate tone. 
This could be demonstrated in his statement to the Second Doha Summit on 
15 June 2005 which called for ‘constructive dialogue’ and finding ‘common 
ground’ with the North.49 Abdullah was also concern about ensuring the 
continuing relevance and effectiveness of NAM. Towards this end, Malaysia 
under the Abdullah administration had pushed forward the revitalisation 
process of NAM, as set out by the Kuala Lumpur Declaration which provides 
the course of action for structural reforms.50 
  
b) Malaysia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
                                               
47
 Compare Mahathir’s proposed East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) with the current East 
Asia Summit (EAS) in which the former proposal had intended to exclude the US, Australia 
and New Zealand, i.e. non-Asian countries. For detailed analysis of the EAEC, see 
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iconoclast come to rule,’ Asian Journal of Political Science, Volume 4, Issue 1, 1-16; Yang, J. 
(year unknown) ‘East Asian Community: Surmounting the History Issue,’ New Zealand 
International Review; Milner, A., & Johnson, D. (2004). ‘The Idea of Asia,’ Faculty of Asian 
Studies, Australian National University (ANU), etc.  See also M. G. G. Pillai. (1993).  ‘APEC: 
Cultural Chasm,’ Economic and Political Weekly (Vol. 28, No. 52). Stable URL: 
[http://www.jstor.org/stable/4400588].  
48
 Cited from Ahmad Mokhtar Selat. (2006). ‘New Directions in Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: 
From Tunku to Abdullah Badawi.’ In Malaysia’s Foreign Relations, University of Malaya 
Press (UMP). 
49
 Source: [http://www.g77.org/southsummit2/speeches/malaysia.pdf].  
50
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Foreign Affairs (IDFR). See ‘Post-NAM Summit: What Next?,’ Chapter 36, page 292-294. 
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ASEAN has always been a cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy. Mahathir 
had accorded ASEAN renewed emphasis as one of the four main pillars in his 
foreign policy.51 As highlighted, Mahathir was keen for ASEAN to take the 
initiative in East Asian supra-regional integration. However, it feel to 
Abdullah to move forward with the need to further develop the regional 
body’s engagement with China, Japan and South Korea as part of a larger 
community-building process in East Asia.52 The ultimate ambition is to create 
an economic bloc and gargantuan common market known as the East Asian 
Community (EAC). At the first East Asia Summit in 2005, India, Australia 
and New Zealand were incorporated as additional members. Abdullah’s 
ASEAN external initiatives were widely seen as an attempt to revive 
Mahathir’s EAEC debacle in a repackaged form which is more inclusive and 
palatable to Japan. The momentum would still come from the region via the 
‘ASEAN Plus 3’ cooperation,53 which also provides the nucleus for the larger 
inclusion. To move towards the goal of an EAC, the idea of an East Asian 
Summit (EAS) was mooted based on the ‘Final Report’ (2002) of the East 
Asian Study Group (EASG) specially set up to study the feasibility of greater 
regional integration. The first East Asia Summit (EAS) was convened on 14 
December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur when Abdullah was chairman of ASEAN.54 
 
In his capacity as chairman of ASEAN, Abdullah oversaw several related 
policy recommendations such as that arising from the 3rd Meeting of Network 
of East Asia Think Tank (NEAT) in August 2005 (Tokyo) entitled ‘Towards 
an East Asia Community’ and the 3rd East Asia Forum held in October 2005 
(Beijing). Other region-wide policy developments included the Asian Bond 
Market Initiative (ABMI) and the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which formed 
important contributions to the monetary and financial stability of ASEAN. 
One of the fundamental purposes is to recycle foreign exchange surpluses 
back into the region in the form of infrastructural investment to boost 
economic development. Such investments have been conceived made with the 
view of facilitating inter-regional exchanges in the border areas such as the 
Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) economic development scheme.55  
 
• Malaysia’s Bilateral Relations with Selected ASEAN 
Countries 
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a) Malaysia-Thai Relations 
Malaysia’s bilateral relations with certain ASEAN countries were affected by 
the ‘soft’ personality and perceived indecisiveness of prime minister Abdullah.  
It was argued that the then Thai prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra who had 
already developed personal admiration for and rapport with Mahathir did not 
have high regard for his successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.56   
 
Malaysia-Thai relations during the Abdullah administration were also 
adversely affected by the perceived arrogance of Thaksin when he insisted that 
Malaysia was harbouring the militant separatists and also for the escalation of 
violence in the four Thai southern provinces.57 The situation only improved 
when Thaksin was removed from power by a coup d'état. This allowed for 
better Thai-Malaysia relations under Thaksin’s successor, General Surayud 
Chulanont who served as the interim prime minister. A bridge linking Bukit 
Bunga (Kelantan, Malaysia) and Ban Buketa (Narathiwat, Thailand) jointly 
constructed by Malaysia and Thailand under the Joint Development Strategy 
for Border Areas enhance the facilitation of cross-border trade marked an 
important milestone in the 50 years of Thai-Malaysia relations.58 It revived the 
political trust and confidence on both sides which were marred when Thaksin 
was prime minister of Thailand. 
Surayud’s successor, Samak Sundaravej of the People Power Party (PPP) - 
successor to the Thai Rak Thai party of the ousted Thaksin - was on cordial 
terms with Abdullah. The circumstances at the time were more shaped by 
global events. Primarily, the unprecedented rise in the price of staple 
consumption, amongst which was rice, compelled Malaysia place the 
commodity as a crucial element in bilateral discussions, including an increase 
in demand from Thailand.59 
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b) Malaysia-Singapore Relations 
During Mahathir’s premiership, Malaysia-Singapore relations were 
characterised by ambivalence and irregular eruptions of underlying tensions.60 
Although both Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew were seen as strongmen, 
respectively, the former came under much pressure not to give the impression 
of making too many concessions to the latter. Contentious issues revolved 
around the sale of water and sand to Singapore, the remaining plot of land 
owned by Keretapi Tanah Melayu (KTM) in Tanjong Pagar, near Keppel 
harbour, land reclamation projects along the Straits of Johor, violation of 
Malaysia’s airspace by the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF), etc. The 
Points of Agreement (POA) signed in 1990 between the two countries 
continue to be a sore point in bilateral relations because of disagreements over 
the interpretation.61 Expressions of contempt were exchanged surfaced from 
time to time as reported in the mass media.  
 
The Abdullah administration, thus, was touted as successful in ‘thawing’ the 
frosty relations which existed hitherto. Malaysia-Singapore ties improved 
quite significantly as soon as Abdullah took over the premiership from 
Mahathir62. Abdullah was rather successful in ‘co-opting’ the participation of 
Singapore into the Iskandar Malaysia project in south Johor63 which envisage 
an area twice the size of the island republic as an international hub for 
manufacturing, processing, medical and agro-tourism, education, etc.64  
 
Courting Singaporean investment in the Iskandar Malaysia project has been 
regarded as crucial in the foreign policy calculation of the Abdullah 
administration. Iskandar Malaysia had been conceptualised to be Shenzhen 
with Singapore as Hong Kong. Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore current prime 
minister, has promised to make ‘iconic investment.’65 As in the case of 
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 See The Star, 24 November 2008, “S’pore to make ‘iconic investment’ in Iskandar M'sia: 
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Singapore vis-à-vis the Iskandar Malaysia project, bilateral ties with the two 
neighbouring countries have produced tangible results. 
 
c) Malaysia-Indonesia Relations 
One of Malaysia’s most important bilateral relations has been with its 
neighbour, Indonesia. It has been argued that Malaysia experienced relatively 
good relations with Indonesia when both Mahathir and Suharto were leaders 
of their respective countries.  The fall of Suharto and the reformasi movement, 
had to certain extent affected Indonesia’s ties with Malaysia, particularly after 
the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim who had a large following amongst many 
Muslims in Southeast Asia.  Indonesia’s ties with post-Mahathir Malaysia had 
somewhat improved but soon bilateral relations were influenced by a series of 
events/episodes, mainly involving the mistreatment or abuse of Indonesian 
migrant workers, territorial disputes such as the case of Ambalat and other 
issues which had been sensationalised by the ’free’ post-Suharto Indonesian 
media.  
 
Abdullah’s term as prime minister coincided with the appointment of Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono as the country’s president, succeeding Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, who had developed warm relations with Malaysia towards the 
end of Mahathir’s term. It is interesting to note that quite a number of 
members of the Indonesian academia, media and government officials have 
acknowledged the similarties in the personality and style of Susilo and 
Abdullah. Both leaders have been perceived by their people as slow, 
indecisive and less effective.66  
 
However, Malaysia’s relations with Indonesia were seen to be moving towards 
the right direction in the last year or two of Abdullah’s premiership.  Both 
sides were seen committed to resolve some of the major issues in their 
bilateral ties. The formation of the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) on 
Malaysia-Indonesia bilateral relations in 200867 could be regarded as a 
manifestation of the commitment of the leadership of both countries to seek 
                                                                                                                           
(http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/11/24/nation/20081124081835&sec=nation)
. It has to be highlighted that Mahathir strongly opposes the Iskandar Malaysia project. He 
sees it as ‘sell-out’ of Malaysia’s sovereignty to Singapore. Mahathir also believes that this is 
inimical to the interests of the Malays. 
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was initially viewed as someone slow, weak and ineffective – similar personality traits 
attributed to Abdullah. 
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solution to some of the ongoing irritants that have troubled relations between 
the two ‘siblings’.68 
 
Malaysia’s Foreign Policy Orientations under Najib: Some General 
Observations and Future Trends 
 
Najib Tun Razak, succeeded Abdullah Ahmad Badawi as the country’s sixth 
prime minister on April 3, 2009, at the time when the country was 
experiencing serious political challenges as well as economic uncertainties.  
Najib inherited a fractious and squabbling UMNO and also a dispirited 
Barisan Nasional. In addition, Najib has to deal with the rise of a stronger 
Opposition, bent to win and take over the government in the next General 
Election which is due in 2013.  
 
In the ensuing five months, Najib has already displayed a political 
determination to make foreign policy as a priority. This could be interpreted as 
an attempt to boost foreign policy and simultaneously provide it with more 
‘depth’ than previously. This comes after a period of a ‘hiatus’ in foreign 
policy under Najib’s predecessor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Then it seemed 
that foreign policy ‘revolved’ around Islam Hadhari as the focal point. Foreign 
policy thus was projected with the intention of promoting Malaysia as a 
progressive and moderate Islamic nation.  
 
Hence, the linkage between foreign policy and Islam Hadhari was accorded 
prominence under Abdullah. In this, there was a semblance of continuity with 
the previous prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad who stressed Malaysia’s 
relations with the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). However, 
unlike Mahathir who emphasised the unity of the ummah, Abdullah tended 
towards a distinctive brand of Islam. This necessarily resulted in a collision of 
agenda and conflict of interests within the OIC. Nonetheless, in the period 
between the Mahathir and Najib era, Malaysian foreign policy was rather 
lacklustre comparatively. That is, it did not acquire the stature associated with 
the visionary leadership of Mahathir who conceived foreign policy in strategic 
terms. 
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Hence, Najib’s foreign policy initiatives have been widely interpreted as a 
vital measure to ‘reactivate’ Malaysia’s foreign policy, after what has been 
perceived as 13 months of ‘attention deficit’ since the March 2008 general 
elections.69 This involves reasserting Malaysia’s strategic interests and 
perhaps revisiting certain assumptions or attitudes held by the previous (i.e. 
Abdullah) administration.70 Some of the ‘tell-tale’ signs emerging are such as 
his explicit commitment to reshaping and adjusting foreign policy priorities ‘to 
meet the changing world order.’71  Concretely, this will take the form of, for 
example, ‘deepening and broadening’ long-standing relations with China.72   
 
It has to be noted that the re-orientation in policy would be reflective of 
Najib’s personal involvement. This would be reminiscent of the Mahathir era 
when foreign policy was micro-managed and effectively helmed by the prime 
minister even though there was a foreign minister to fulfil the role.73 Such an 
approach, however, would be consonant with Najib’s style of leadership and 
governance, which has been  associated with ‘Mahathirism.’ It is therefore 
plausible that foreign policy is set to make its mark as a distinctive feature of 
Najib’s premiership. He clearly spoke of foreign policy as coming under the 
domain of the theme, ‘1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now,’ which was 
introduced in conjunction with his appointment as prime minister. In a keynote 
address at the 7th Heads of Mission Conference, ‘Malaysian Foreign Policy: 
Future Direction for 2009-2015’ to diplomats, Najib said this: 
 
“When I became Prime Minister … I said our 
government would focus on performance for the 
people, and I spoke of my hope that our nation 
would move forward under the theme of 
‘1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now.’ I 
have emphasized these principles at home, and 
they are also the principles that will shape our 
foreign policy (emphasis author’s) … [W]e must 
… reshape and adjust our domestic and foreign 
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policy priorities to meet the changing world 
order.”74 
 
How 1Malaysia will be the guiding philosophy for foreign policy remains to 
be seen in its thorough extent. Nevertheless, the need to re-forge the country’s 
economy again on the same continuing basis of political stability and social 
harmony has been Najib’s constant emphasis.75 Najib certainly believes that 
the start of his premiership come at a time when Malaysia is at a crossroads of 
economic development. It is certain that to pursue 1Malaysia, etc. in foreign 
policy entails that the nation can no longer afford to remain ‘stuck’ at the 
middle-income ‘trap,’ but must move forward on an extensive economic 
growth which will further boost the living standards and income of the people. 
 
Economics as a Primary Determinant in Malaysia’s Foreign Relations 
and Diplomacy 
 
• New Economic Model (NEM) 
In order for an economic transformation to take place, Malaysia’s 
globalisation pace must accelerate. This interdependence with the rest of the 
world is given explicit recognition in Najib’s policy speeches.76 The openness 
to FDI remains vital for Malaysia’s development77; and also impacts on its 
bilateral relations.78 What is being (re)emphasised as the paradigm is 
globalisation as a changing force. This mean openness to FDI and removing 
trade barriers, etc. are not only the means but the goal of economic 
development.  
 
In his speech at the ‘Investment Malaysia Conference,’ organised by Invest 
Malaysia, Najib reiterated his commitment to sustaining nation’s reputation as 
a ‘diversified and broad-based’ capital market in Asia, and the world’s largest 
syariah-compliant bond market. The Capital Market Master Plan of the 
government entails ‘greater internationalisation.’ The Master Plan seeks to 
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(re)position Malaysia’s capital market to enable ‘wider participation by 
foreign investors.’  
 
Najib’s foreign policy is, therefore, attuned towards portraying Malaysia’s 
business-friendly credentials, especially in trying to tap into sovereign wealth 
funds from China and East Asia - trading surplus nations. This was precisely 
alluded to by Najib in his banquet speech in Beijing to the Chinese business 
community.79 Thus foreign capital has always been crucial to sustaining 
Malaysia’s model of economic success.80 A good bilateral relation would pave 
the way for deeper trade and investment links with attendant reciprocal 
benefits.  
 
By extension, participation in multilateral frameworks supported by rational 
foreign policy orientation enhances economic cooperation and exchanges.81 In 
this regard, it is important to realise that Malaysia like many countries rely on 
the leadership of the world’s economic powers to be the driving force of 
growth regionally as well as internationally.82 
 
• Political Legitimacy and Regime Stability through Pragmatic 
Foreign Policy Initiatives and Diplomacy 
As mentioned earlier, Najib has inherited a much weakened UMNO and 
Barisan Nasional. The next three years before the next (13th) general elections 
remain a challenge to the Najib leadership as many ordinary Malaysians from 
both the urban and rural areas have been seriously affected by the rising 
inflation and the overall decline in their standard of living and quality of life. 
In addition to the economic challenges, non-economic issues such as those 
pertaining to human rights, growing crime rates, corruption, poor health 
services, environmental degradation, racial/religious polarisation and other 
related socio-economic problems have posed a real test to the government of 
the day.   
 
Subsequently, the Najib administration has to be more open and responsive to 
the growing needs and demands of the people, many of whom had decided to 
vote for the Opposition in the 2008 General Election.  Thus, the next electoral 
performance of the BN government will be assessed by how well the Najib 
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leadership responses to the long list of demands of many diverse groups and 
individuals whose quality of lives have been seriously affected by the current 
global economic uncertainties 
 
In its effort to win back the trust and confidence of the people, it is thus 
critical for the BN government to formulate policies and programmes which 
could win the ‘hearts and minds’ of ordinary Malaysians. Sound and 
pragmatic policies and actions by the Najib administration must address 
current major challenges faced by the country, mainly in economics and those 
pertaining to social justice and national unity. By extension, foreign policy 
initiatives and diplomacy of the country under Najib must serve the 
socioeconomic needs and interests of the people. In effect, the legitimacy and 
regime stability of the Najib administration is very much linked to the 
successful implementation of sound public policies and programmes, 
including those pertaining to foreign relations and diplomacy. 
 
• Economic Recovery and Transformation 
The seeming revival of Malaysia’s foreign policy from relative lull could point 
to a renewed outlook in which it is being repositioned to pave the way for 
economic transformation. In other words, for Najib it is vital that ‘recovery’ in 
foreign policy can lead or contribute to economic recovery. Since Q483 of 
2008, export performance in Malaysia has slumped considerably, due to 
decline in demand from the US in particular which is affected by the financial 
crisis.84 In turn, the financial crisis was triggered by a ‘credit crunch’ and an 
economic bust. The US has historically been the largest source of the FDI85 to 
Malaysia, especially in the manufacturing sector86 and also the most important 
trade partner for Malaysia (see Table 1 for growth in US FDI in Malaysia). 
Bilateral trade amounted to some USD46 billion (= RM163 billion) in 2007.87 
The US alone accounted for more than one-tenth of the country’s exports in 
2008 (see Table 2), which is significant given Malaysia’s trade connectivity 
with the rest of the world. 
 
                                               
83
 Q4 = fourth quarter of the year.  
84
 Source: [http://www.statistics.gov.my]. 
85
 See also 
[http://www.statistics.gov.my/eng/images/stories/files/journalDOSM/ArticleIVol12008.pdf] 
86
 US FDI in Malaysia was USD15.7 billion (= RM56 billion) in 2007, a 25 percent increase 
from 2006. Information derived from the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR).  
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Table 1  
FDI POSITION BY COMPONENT, MALAYSIA, 2001- 2007 (IN RM 
BILLION) 
 
Component 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FDI in 
Malaysia 
129.1 142.7 156.5 163.6 168.1 190.1 253.8 
Equity 
Capital 
63.2 67.6 77.6 81.5 81.9 101.7 135.7 
Reinvested 
Earnings 
49.9 59.0 64.1 69.5 74.4 79.8 107.1 
Other 
Capital 
16.0 16.1 14.7 12.5 11.8 8.6 11.0 
 
Increasing FDI inflows, including technology transfer, to Malaysia (as a net 
recipient) and effectuating a move up the ‘value chain,’ means that in Najib’s 
foreign policy there must be a balance between the dual necessities of priority 
and reality. At present, the priority is economic recovery, which accounts for 
Najib’s timely visit to China. The grounds of the significant visit for Najib’s 
premiership are the historic establishment of diplomatic ties thirty years ago 
and the unhindered rise of China as the emerging and rival superpower to the 
US. Najib’s own ‘Look East’ policy is also propitious not least because of a 
fundamental re-alignment in US foreign policy under President Barack 
Obama. This scenario invites the consideration of Malaysia’s foreign policy in 

















(%)   
Singapore 97.78 14.7 
United States Of America 80.47 12.1 
Japan 71.80 10.8 
China 63.21 9.5 
Thailand 31.73 4.8 
Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region 
- SAR) 
28.32 4.3 
South Korea 25.89 3.9 
India 24.73 3.7 
Australia 24.40 3.7 
Netherlands 23.44 3.5 
Others 191.71 28.9 
TOTAL EXPORTS 663.49  




Najib realises that in the push to climb out of the ‘middle-income trap,’ 
Malaysia needs to leverage on technological transfer from the US and new 
investments from China. So that even if Najib looks to China as a ‘co-leader’ 
in the world’s economy, China in turn will continue to look to the US as the 
world’s largest consumer nation, as providing the driving force of global 
demand for manufactured goods.  That, it is submitted, the reality for the 
foreseeable future at least. The inflow of foreign capital from US and China 
can be conceptualised from the perspective of Najib’s foreign policy as 
complementary, and to have distinct roles in relation to the Malaysian 
                                               
88
 RM = Ringgit Malaysia. 
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economy. Thus, the influence of China and US in Malaysia’s foreign policy 
‘balances’ each other, consonant with a non- or multi-polar environment.  
 
• Malaysia Foreign Policy in an Age of Non-Polarity/Multi-
Polarity 
Much has been articulated and argued about the emerging new international 
political order caused by the gradual decline of US economic hegemony. It is 
envisaged that Najib’s foreign policy in its ‘post-Mahathir phase’ would 
correspond to the new ‘soft power’ outlook of the US under Obama, in which 
Malaysia will once again re-assume an important role as a Southeast Asian 
ally in, for example, regional security.  
 
Even though the ‘equilibrium’ or balancing act in sourcing US technology and 
Chinese investment is integral to Najib’s foreign policy calculation, it is 
argued that such a scenario might not last indeterminately. In preserving the 
‘system’ of state capitalism which is allied to ethnic-based politics, the 
investment climate in Malaysia remains unfavourable to many US investors. 
Current joint-ventures (JVs) may have either outgrown their usefulness in 
terms of the level or sophistication of the technology or incapable of 
contributing to Malaysia’s elevation to a high-income nation. Then Malaysia 
would become increasingly dependent upon Chinese technological expertise. 
To compensate for the decline in US private investment, Malaysia may have 
to rely more on strategic alliances through ‘non-economic’ investments in e.g. 
armaments and aerospace industry. Thus, regional security - which affects the 
free movement of people, resources and services, and therefore, economic 
stability - can play a vital role in Najib’s foreign policy calculations in relation 
to the US.  
 
Coming from the background of a former Defence Minister who has more 
than a decade’s experience, Najib might be predisposed to re-affirms 
Malaysia’s commitment to ensuring the security of Straits of Malacca, one of 
the world’s strategic sea lines of communication, in re-adjusting economic 
directions via foreign policy. 
  
Some Preliminary Observations and Future Trends – Foreign Policy 
Orientations and Relations under Najib 
 
The Najib administration must be able to revisit and re-prioritise Malaysia’s 
foreign policy objectives and direction since many of the pressing domestic 
political and socio-economic interests of the country could be served by 
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having viable and pragmatic foreign policy initiatives, particularly those 
pertaining to economics, namely trade and investment. 
 
Problems caused by the current global economic uncertainties have had 
enormous impact on the country’s domestic economy. As many workers 
particularly those working with private companies have either been retrenched 
or received less salary, the government is pressured to come out with sound 
policies and programmes which could help stimulate the economic growth and 
development. The development of Iskandar Malaysia is one example where 
the domestic political as well as economic needs of the country are very much 
linked to the receptivity of other countries, namely the international business 
community or investors, to Malaysia’s pro-investment and liberal economic 
policies.  Thus, it is the argument here that Malaysia’s foreign policy priorities 
and direction in the years to come would have to take into account the current 
domestic political and economic limitations and challenges.  
 
These constraints would also have a decisive impact on the foreign policy 
options for Malaysia against the backdrop of an increasingly demanding 
electorate whose economic livelihood have been affected by the turbulent 
global economy. As Malaysia’s foreign relations will be much more 
influenced and constrained by domestic considerations, it is thus imperative 
for the Najib government to re-prioritise the country’s external conduct.  Since 
Malaysia is no longer in the strong position as it was back in the days of the 
Mahathir years (where Malaysia pursued an active and also adventurous 
external relations with so many countries in the world), re-prioritisation of the 
country’s foreign policy is indeed crucial to ensure that at the end of the day 
they do serve the national interests of its people.   
 
In conducting its external relations, Malaysia under Najib needs to re-examine 
its foreign policy priorities in such a way that they serve the best interests of 
the country, particularly against the backdrop of recessionary global economy. 
Malaysia’s economic relations with the US and China will remain important in 
the long haul. Malaysia must be pragmatic enough to explore new areas of 
cooperation with the US - motivated by the existing geo-political reality albeit 
given a new perspective in a multi-/non-polar framework - as many countries 










For now, Najib has to convince the people that his leadership is actually very 
responsive to the needs and demands of the people who have been affected by 
the global economic downturn in the last two years or so through the 
‘1Malaysia, People First, Performance Now’ philosophy.  Pragmatic foreign 
policy initiatives, namely those that could help stimulate growth and economic 
recovery, are very much desired so that the socioeconomic welfare of the 
people will be adequately addressed and fulfilled. For example, the Najib 
leadership must be able to allay fear amongst the local people, for example 
those residing in Iskandar or Nusajaya, Johor that his pro-business policies 
which had succeeded in attracting foreign investors from neighbouring 
Singapore as well as many from the Middle East and the United States, would 
not be detrimental to their interests and welfare.  
 
While one acknowledges the importance of strong foreign economic relations 
in reviving the domestic economy of the country, the Najib administration has 
to ensure that policies are implemented with the interests of the larger public 
at heart. But Malaysia’s foreign policy under Najib should not be overly 
ambitious. Foreign relations ought to be pursued on the basis of realistic 
prospects combined with visionary objectives which promote the interests of 
the people.   
 
While one cannot deny the importance of Malaysia’s membership and role in 
multilateral arrangements such as the UN, OIC and NAM in helping to serve 
the country’s national interests, the Najib leadership should not attempt to 
overstretch the limited resources and administrative capacity of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Malaysia (MOFA) in managing the activities related to these 
organisations.   
The leadership of the country must be pragmatic and realistic that Malaysia 
might never ‘revert’ to the era of an active and assertive diplomacy of the 
Mahathir years where the country was bent on extending its influence geo-
strategically in all four corners of the globe. Closely related to this is the need 
for Malaysia to focus more on the bilateral relations with selected countries 
which are deemed to be most crucial to Malaysia’s national interests, namely 
big powers like the US, China, India and Japan. To elaborate further, Malaysia 
should not focus so much attention to multilateral frameworks such as the OIC 
and NAM but rather invest and leverage more on improving bilateral ties with 
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key individual member-states so as to extract maximal advantages and benefits 




                                               
89
 A good example can be gleaned from the ‘Avoidance of Double Taxation’ agreements 
which are now a common feature in bilateral relations. These agreements involve both 
governments refraining from imposing tax on the same proceeds or revenue of firms which are 
located overseas (i.e. host country) whilst the headquarters is in the country of origin. 
Malaysia is a signatory of the ‘Avoidance of Double Taxation’ agreements (limited or 
otherwise) with some sixty countries.  
See [http://www.mida.gov.my/en_v2/index.php?page=double-taxation] for more information. 
